Entities

Facs

Tillich Lectures

Transcript

[119]

to distinguish the scientific probabilities which are confirmed or refuted by continously-going-on experimentation—on the one side, where nobody or nothing is allowed to interfere, neither a totalitarian state nor authoritarian religion; and that, on the other hand, there is the dimension of ultimate concern, its experiences and its symbols. These experiences cannot be denied either, and if they are, then you must show to the people who do so that they don’t deny them in the name of their scientific method but in the name of their theological or metaphysical presuppositions of which they are not aware.

Now this leads me to another conflict which is going on during these two conflicts—d and the Church, f and the Church—and it is going on all the time between them and all the time today, namely: the conflict between a mechanistic interpretation of reality and the experience of freedom which every human being has, including those who preach mechanism—and preaching is an expression of their freedom!

The best pattern for this has been brought about by the French astronomer h, who said that if in a given moment all facts of this given moment are given to him, he can calculate everything which will happen, in heaven and on earth, ever since.1 Now this means Lamarck puts himself in the position of a divine outside observer and then describes the process of the world as mechanically calculable processes. Now the first answer to this is that Lamarck forgets that every observer belongs to the processes which he observed himself. In order to make such statements, the observer must forget himself as an element of that which he observes. Modern science does not


Footnotes, Editorial notes

1 This refers to the so-called Laplacean demon. It is a thought experiment based on the assumption that, given sufficient knowledge, one could deduce a complete chain of causality. In other words, it represents the determinism of the physical worldview up until the 20th century (see Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les probabilities [1814], Introduction: “Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les forces […] rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir, comme le passé, serait présent à ses yeux.”). Lamarck shares Laplace’s view. He alludes to this in his late work Système analytique des connaissances positives de l’homme (Paris, 1820), in the chapter on freedom and free will (Part Two, chapter “De la liberté”). There he paraphrases: “Wenn man in einem gegebenen Augenblick alle Tatsachen (Positionen/Bewegungen) kennt, ließe sich alles Zukünftige (und Vergangene) berechnen.” Tillich’s (or Peter John's) confusion of Laplace and Lamarck is likely attributable to his otherwise broad philosophical-historical generalizations, since both are regarded as critics of traditional metaphysical free will.

Register

aUltimate_Concern
bSymbols
cThesis
dGalilei, Galileo
eChurch
fDarwin, Charles
gFreedom
hLamarck, Jean-Baptiste

Entities

Keywords

Persons

TL-0122.pdfTL-0121.htmlTL-0123.html